Corporate culture does matter. Using data on mission statements of large Japanese firms, we show that corporate culture has a significant impact on corporate policies that determine employment, board, and financial structures. We provide evidence that strong-culture firms are more likely to retain incumbent employees, promote managers from within firms, and have less debt and a higher percentage of interlocking shareholdings than weak-culture firms. This evidence suggests that strong-culture firms consider their culture to be organizational capital and adopt policies to preserve it.
Introduction
Recently, corporate culture has been acknowledged to be a significant determinant of organizational behavior and performance. The press and the mass media often make references to a specific corporation's culture, such as the HP Philosophy, the IBM Way, and 3M Value, and attribute each company's competitive advantage to its culture.
Furthermore, several books and various case studies have focused on corporate culture to explain how it works, how it changes and evolves, and how it influences behavior and corporate performance (e.g., Deal and Kennedy, 1982 : Schein, 1985 : Collins and Poras, 1994 .
In spite of the popular attention paid to corporate culture, however, very few quantitative studies have been conducted to establish its importance. The scarcity of quantitative evidence can be attributed to the fact that corporate cultures have tacit, ambiguous, and unobservable aspects, which are usually hard to measure using publicly available information, and thus pose an obstacle to quantitative analysis.
There are a few exceptional works such as Denison (1984) , Gordon and DiTomaso (1992) , Kotter and Heskett (1992) , and Sorensen (2002) which report that corporate culture and cultural strength are associated with superior performance. However, these previous studies focused almost exclusively on culture's impact on performance.
Needless to say, ascertaining the statistically significant performance effects of culture, and determining whether a particular culture enhances or harms performance are not easy tasks.
In this paper, we examine the significance of corporate culture by focusing on its impact on corporate policies. Considering corporate culture to be organizational capital, we set forth the hypothesis that culture shapes corporate policies that determine employment, board and financial structures. More specifically, we hypothesize that strong-culture firms are more likely to retain incumbent employees, promote managers from within firms, and reduce the probability of default and hostile takeovers than weak-culture firms.
One of the distinguishing features of this paper is the use of the mission statement as a proxy for corporate culture. It is true that it is not always clear whether the norms and values of the mission statement have actually been adopted and implemented by the corporation. But the advantage of using the mission statement is that it puts into writing the norms and values that corporations require their employees to share and adopt. We also examine how the mission statement is embedded among employees in order to identify the strength of a particular corporate culture.
Our study is conducted on large-sized Japanese firms for the period from 1986 to 2000. The corporate culture of Japanese firms has attracted much attention since the 1980s, when it was considered to be a source of their competitive advantage in global markets (Ouchi, 1981: Pascale and Athos, 1981) . Despite this attention, however, little quantitative evidence on the importance of the corporate culture of Japanese firms has been collected.
Testing for the period when Japanese firms were buffeted by unexpectedly large business fluctuations arising from the burgeoning and collapse of the bubble, the subsequent long-term recession, and the banking crisis of 1997, our empirical results show that corporate culture and its strength significantly affect corporate policies.
Through business upturns and downturns, strong-culture firms are more likely to adopt policies that encourage long-term employment, and to have more managers promoted from within the firm than weak-culture firms. Strong-culture firms are also more likely to have less debt, and a high percentage of interlocking shareholdings than weak-culture firms. All of our empirical results show that corporate culture does matter for the policy choices of Japanese companies. Interestingly, in spite of policy choices which are frequently regarded to be impediments to corporate performance in the finance literature, 1 firms with strong cultures performed relatively better throughout this period.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys the field of corporate culture studies and presents our general observations on various approaches to the study of corporate culture. Section 3 presents hypotheses on the effect of culture on corporate policies. Section 4 explains our sample, data, measures of corporate culture, and regression equations. Section 5 presents our empirical results. Section 6 summarizes the results and discusses their implications.
Background

Significance of Corporate Culture: Previous Studies
It has long been assumed that corporate culture can make a significant contribution to corporate performance. Corporate culture, which is sometimes referred to as organizational culture, can be defined as "a set of values, beliefs, and norms of behavior shared by its (a firm's) members that influences employee preferences and behaviors" (Besanko et al., 2007, p.550) . Researchers have claimed that culture can be a major source of efficiency in organizations and improve corporate performance (e.g. Kotter and Heskett, 1992 : Cremer, 1993 : Hermalin, 2001 : Besanko et al., 2007 . They have argued that the performance benefits of corporate culture derive from three effects.
Culture can have a goal-setting effect when it specifies the goals of the firm and makes it easier for employees to make daily decisions. Culture has a coordination effect when it reduces communication costs and facilitates coordination among employees. And culture has a motivation effect when employees become more highly motivated as a result of embracing the company's culture.
The view that corporate culture has a significant influence on performance is widely held in academia and by the media, but the empirical evidence that can be marshaled to support this view is scant. Most researchers have relied on anecdotes or case studies and therefore have produced studies of little quantitative value. The difficulty of directly measuring the impact and strength of corporate culture has posed obstacles to the conduct of quantitative research in this area. The exceptions are Denison (1984) , Gordon and DiTomaso (1992) , Kotter and Heskett (1992) , and Sorensen (2002) , who report that a strong corporate culture is associated with superior performance. However, it is difficult to determine a positive correlation between culture and performance because some firms may have nonadaptive or defective cultures that actually harm performance (Kotter and Heskett, 1992: Hodgeson, 1996) .
Corporate Culture and Corporate Policies
As shown above, previous quantitative studies on corporate culture have focused almost exclusively on the association between culture and performance. Few studies have spotlighted the effect of culture on a firm's policies and strategies.
2 2 The exception is Cronqvist, Low, and Nilsson's (2007) econometric study, which we came across in the course of revising our paper. While their study has a title which is similar to ours and presents evidence that corporate culture significantly affects a firm's policies, as does our paper, it adopts an approach which is significantly different from ours. They argue that firms with similar cultures exhibit similar corporate policies, and seek to prove their argument by showing the commonality of investment and financial policies between spinoff and parent firms. By contrast, we argue that firms with their own corporate culture adopt policies that preserve the culture as organizational capital, and attempt to show that a firm's cultural strength affects employment, board, and financial structures.
In this paper, we examine the significance of corporate culture, focusing on corporate policies affecting employment, board and financial structures. We hypothesize that culture, which can be viewed as firm-specific capital, affects these policies. Firm-specific capital, which is also called organizational capital, is an asset specific to and embedded into an organization, and includes employees' skills and know-how that have use only within a particular firm, information on each employee's aptitude for a particular job, experience in coordinating diverse production technologies, and the goodwill of customers. Firm-specific capital usually has the following characteristics: it is a productive resource unique to a particular firm and not transferable to other firms; it ceases to be productive when the firm is dissolved; and it is accumulated through investment (Prescott and Visscher, 1980 : Iwai, 2002 : Lev and Radhakrishnan, 2004 . Corporate culture has these three characteristics of firm-specific capital; it is hard to imitate; it disappears with the demise of an organization; and it is accumulated through the learning and education of employees.
If we regard corporate culture to be firm-specific capital and valuable in enhancing performance, we can assume that strong-culture firms have an incentive to maintain and utilize the culture rather than build a new (different) culture. Preserving corporate culture and sustaining the organization in which the culture is embedded can increase the firm's value via two effects. First, it raises current performance. The firm takes advantage of its accumulated culture to operate efficiently. Second, it improves future performance. Observing that the culture and the organization continue to exist, the employees are encouraged to make culture-specific investments which facilitate further accumulation of organizational capital.
Therefore, strong-culture firms can be assumed to adopt policies that preserve the culture and the organization, and maximize the benefits emanating from the culture.
We can surmise that corporate culture affects the firm's employment, board, and financial structures. We hypothesize that strong-culture firms are more likely to retain incumbent employees, promote managers from within, and reduce the probability of default and hostile takeovers than weak-culture firms. We will explain these hypotheses in the next section.
Hypotheses
We explore the effect of culture on corporate policies by analyzing whether strong-culture firms tend to select employment, board, and financial structures that help to preserve their own culture and organization. Previous research has defined a culture to be strong if norms and values are widely shared and intensely held throughout an organization (O'Reilly and Chatman, 1996) . We have developed the following hypotheses to help explain the relationship between the strength of corporate culture and corporate policies and structures.
Hypothesis 1 (long-term employment):
Strong-culture firms are more likely to adopt long-term employment policies than weak-culture firms.
As long as their corporate culture is embedded into their employees, strong-culture firms are more likely to retain their incumbent employees than weak-culture firms.
Employees with high levels of cultural knowledge are an important foundation of organizational capital. Strong-culture firms tend to hold on to incumbent employees rather than hire new workers from labor markets. At the same time, their long-term employment policies encourage younger employees to make culture-specific investments to increase future organizational capital.
3
Thus, we can assume that strong-culture firms are more likely to take long-term employment policies than weak-culture firms.
Hypothesis 2 (internally promoted managers)
Managers promoted from within firms comprise a greater percentage of the management teams at strong-culture firms than at weak-culture firms.
It is assumed that managers need to fully understand a firm's culture in order to run the firm efficiently. Since a culture consists of values, beliefs, and subtle interpretations, internally promoted managers who have worked for the company for a long time have an advantage over managers appointed from the outside with respect to knowledge of the firm's culture. Chowdhry and Garmaise (2004) formulated a model that shows that cultural complementarity exists among members of an organization. They suggest that the culture embedded into employees is functional only when it is also embraced by the management. Therefore, the optimal choice for strong-culture firms would be to recruit more managers from within their firms to their management teams.
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Hypothesis 3 (low leverage)
Strong-culture firms have less debt than weak-culture firms.
Zingales (2000) argues that financial distress inflicts higher costs on firms with large amounts of organizational capital because the distress not only has financial repercussions but also destroys the organizational capital. His argument suggests that because strong-culture firms have a greater amount of organizational capital than weak-culture firms, they are more eager to avoid financial distress. Since the possibility of financial distress depends not only on a firm's performance but also on its leverage, strong-culture firms should make capital structure decisions that lead to lower debt ratios. In fact, Donaldson (1984) suggests that corporate managers like to be able to rely on internally generated cash flow, rather than debt, to stay in business.
We conjecture that his observation is more likely to apply to strong-culture firms.
Hypothesis 4 (interlocking shareholding)
Interlocking shareholdings are more likely to be observed in strong-culture firms than in weak-culture firms. Iwai (2002) argues that the value of companies characterized by firm-specific organizational capital will increase when outside shareholders exercise weaker control;
and that tighter control by outside shareholders increases the probability of hostile takeovers, causing the hold-up problem that prevents employees from investing in firm-specific human assets. Zingales (2000) also raises questions about whether control should reside in the hands of shareholders, given the importance of organizational capital. He accepts the possibility that "the pursuit of shareholders' value maximization may lead to inefficient actions, such as the breach of valuable implicit contracts," as described by Shleifer and Summers (1988, p. 1635 ). If we consider corporate culture to be a form of organizational capital, we can predict that strong-culture firms have more incentives to weaken the control of outside shareholders in order to protect their employees' rights. In Japan, interlocking shareholdings are widely perceived to be a means of reducing the probability of hostile takeovers and blocking intervention by outside shareholders (Sheard 1994) . Hence, we can hypothesize that strong-culture firms are more likely to form interlocking relationships with banks and other affiliated companies.
Empirical Analysis
Measures of Cultural Strength
We explore the relationship between corporate culture and corporate policies by testing the hypotheses presented in the previous section, using a sample of large Japanese firms. The corporate cultures of Japanese firms have attracted much attention from the 1980s, since they were thought to be a source of their competitive edge in global markets (Ouchi, 1981: Pascale and Athos, 1981) . Despite this attention, however, little quantitative evidence on the importance of corporate culture for Japanese firms has been presented. Our study seeks to fill this gap.
In previous studies on corporate culture, measuring a firm's cultural strength has always been an issue. Denison (1984) measures cultural strength by assessing the consistency of responses to his survey items across managers in a firm. Kotter and Heskett (1992) construct cultural strength indices from their questionnaire survey of managers of rival firms in the same industry. While we recognize the advantages of these survey approaches, we adopt a different method which utilizes information on corporate mission statements.
A mission statement is a company's written statement of its core values, mission, purpose, goals, principles, and norms. While it is believed that a large number of firms have mission statements, it is not always clear whether the mission statement has been fully implemented by a particular firm. However, the advantage of using the mission statement as a proxy for corporate culture is that it puts into writing those norms and values that a corporation requires employees to share and adopt, and hence can be considered to be an explicit declaration of the corporate culture.
Hence, we measure the cultural strength of each firm by examining whether a firm has a formal mission statement. We assume that firms with formal mission statements have stronger cultures than those without such statements. This assumption appears to be valid for Japanese firms. After conducting interview research on Japanese firms, Ouchi (1981) suggested that defining a mission statement is the first step in creating a cooperative corporate culture. Itami and Kagono (1989) claim, in their Japanese textbook on management and business, that formulating a formal mission statement is the primary method to ensure that an organizational culture will be widely shared and transmitted over generations.
In addition, we also measure the cultural strength of each firm by examining whether a firm has taken concrete and effective steps to embed the mission statement into employees. We believe that the strength of corporate culture depends not only on whether a firm has a mission statement, but also on how effectively the mission statement is embedded among employees. It is natural to assume that among firms with formal mission statements, those with some concrete and effective means of transmitting their content to employees have stronger cultures than firms without such means.
Sample
We obtained mission statement data on Japanese firms from Kigyo Kodo Shishin Jitsureishu (hereafter, KKSJ), which is based on a survey of companies' mission statements conducted by Nikkeiren in June 1997. KKSJ, which was published in 1997, contains the mission statements of 207 responding Japanese firms and the concrete measures (if any) that firms took to embed the content of these statements into their organization.
From these 207 firms we selected our sample according to the following criteria. First, the firm had to be listed on the First Section of the Tokyo Stock
Exchange and could be in any industry except finance, electricity, and gas. 5 This criterion limited our sample to non-financial, non-regulated, and large-sized firms.
Second, a firm's formal mission statement had to be disclosed on its internet homepage in July 2003. This criterion ensures that a firm has maintained its formal mission statement over time and therefore could be considered to have a strong culture.
Applying these criteria left us with 64 firms.
Since we test the impact of the mission statement on corporate policies and performance using the firms' data from the mid-1980s, sample firms should have introduced mission statements, either the current version or an previous version, prior to the mid-1980s, We checked when the identified mission statements of sample firms were introduced through company handbooks and other sources. Twenty-two of the 64 firms established the current version of their mission statement before 1986, and continued to use it. Although the remaining 42 firms introduced the current version of their mission statement after 1986, they are based on older versions of mission statements which have been repeatedly revised. 6 Thus, the final sample consists of 64 firms with enduring mission statements and for that reason they are considered strong-culture firms.
For each of the 64 strong-culture firms, we found a matching firm that is in the same industry as a strong-culture firm, 7 and also listed on the First Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange, but was found not to have a formal mission statement. We selected the matching sample firms according to the following criteria, i) the firm is not included in KKSJ, ii) the firm's formal mission statement did not appear on its internet homepage in July 2003; and iii) among those firms satisfying the above two criteria, the firm's total assets were closest in value to the assets of the strong-culture firm. Following these criteria, we obtained 64 matching sample firms, which we categorize as weak-culture firms. In Table 1 , we list the 64 strong-culture firms and their matching weak-culture firms with their Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) codes.
For the sample of 64 strong-culture firms, we obtained information from KKSJ on whether each had taken any practical and concrete steps to embed the content of the mission statement into employees. We found that 75% of strong-culture firms have taken some embedding steps: 31.25% of the firms put up posters or a framed copy of the mission statement in places of high visibility; 25% of the firms teach the mission statement to current employees in training programs; 21.87% of the firms deliver a mission statement booklet to employees; the top management (president or CEO) of 18.75% of the firms is engaged in embedding the mission statement through speeches, written statements, and direct teaching in the training programs and in day to day operations, etc.; 17.18% of the firms published the mission statement in in-house magazines; other steps include training programs for newly hired employees, affirmations and pledges recited at every morning assembly, distribution of mission statement cards, establishment of internal schools and training centers to teach the mission statement, etc.
Based on the information from 64 strong-culture firms, we then chose firms whose cultures seemed to be embedded more deeply and intensively. To do this, we used two criteria. We first checked whether the top management (president or CEO) is engaged in transmitting the mission statement. Schein (1985) suggests that the leader's attention to culture and deliberate role in teaching it are crucial, and personal involvement by a corporate leader is a powerful primary mechanism for culture embedding and reinforcement. As we saw above, the engagement of the upper echelon of management is observed for 18.75% of the strong-culture firms. We then checked whether a firm has any training system for instilling the mission statement. Itami and Kagono (1989) and Collins and Porras (1994) stress the importance of training for transmitting culture. Kitai and Matsuda's (2002) empirical study on Japanese firms
shows that training for newly hired employees as well as teaching by top management are significantly effective in embedding culture. We selected firms which had at least one of the following training systems to instill the mission statement: training programs for current employees or newly hired employees; affirmations and pledges at every morning assembly; internal schools or training centers dedicated to instilling the mission statement. Of the strong-culture firms, 45.31% had taken such steps.
Regression Equations
To test hypothesis 1, the relation between cultural strength and employment policy, we estimate the following equations. Furthermore, to check the robustness of our results, we also estimate the regression equation by adding two more control variables to each of the equations.
These two variables are ROA (operating income to the book value of total assets; %)
and MKTBK (market-to-book ratio; market value of the total assets to book value of the total assets). Including these two variables is important because a firm's profitability (ROA) and its growth opportunities (MKTBK) may affect corporate policies and structures. In particular, previous studies have shown that with regard to capital structure decisions, these two factors have significant effects on debt to asset ratios (e.g. Harris and Raviv 1991, Rajan and Zingales 1995 , and TRAIN) , we used the same value (0 or 1) for the same firm throughout the sample period. We also added the year dummies to all regressions to control for year-specific effects. can be seen, the majority (71.9%) of firm have mission statements that refer to the need to "contribute to society, happiness of mankind, the creation of culture, and global prosperity." Another striking feature is that only 6.3% of firms voice "concern for the interests of shareholders," while many of them emphasize concern for employees. For example, 37.5% of the firms state that it is their mission to provide worthwhile and fulfilling work for their employees. Panel B shows the types of norms and behavioral standards contained in mission statements. Almost half, or 45.3% of the firms, refer to "innovation and originality" in their mission statements. "Conscientiousness and cordiality on the job" and "rise to the challenge and aggressiveness" appear in the mission statements of 31.3% and 18.8% of the firms, respectively.
Empirical Results
Content of Mission Statements
Descriptive Statistics
The means and standard deviations of the dependent and independent variables in the regression equations are summarized in Table 3 . 9 The first column (Total Sample) shows the statistics for 128 firms over our sample period (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) . The second and third columns (Strong Culture Firms, Weak Culture Firms) provide the statistics for 64 strong-culture firms and 64 weak-culture firms, respectively. The fourth column (Difference) is the difference in the means of each variable for the strong-culture firms and the weak-culture firms. We notice that the mean length of service of employees (EMP) for strong-culture firms (16.35) is larger than that for weak-culture firms (15.56) and the difference (0.79) is statistically significant at less than the 1% level (p-value = 0.000). This is consistent with Hypothesis 1: strong-culture firms are more likely to adopt long-term employment policies than weak-culture firms. We also observe that the mean of the insider board ratio (INSIDER) is significantly higher for the strong-culture firms (92.60) than for the weak-culture firms (87.89); this supports Hypothesis 2. As for the capital structure, the debt ratio (DEBT) of the strong-culture firms (63.26) is a little higher than that of the weak-culture firms (62.43), but the difference is not statistically significant. In addition, the interlocking share ratio (INTERLOCK) is significantly higher for the strong-culture firms (28.91) than for the weak-culture firms (23.59); this is also consistent with Hypothesis 4. As for the control variables, lnTA, AGE and ROA are significantly higher for the strong-culture firms than for the weak-culture firms. This supports our decision to control for size, age, and profitability in the regressions.
Regression Results
The regression results are summarized in Tables 4, 5 , 6, and 7. First, Table 4 shows the results of the employment policy regressions. Looking at column (1-1), we find that CULTURE has a significantly positive coefficient (0.593, p=0.001). This result holds for column (1-1)′, which is regressed on ROA and MKTBK. These results indicate that the length of service of the employees is longer for the strong-culture firms than for the weak-culture firms. This supports Hypothesis 1 (strong-culture firms are more likely to adopt long-term employment policies than weak-culture firms), and suggests that corporate culture does affect a firm's employment policy.
In Table 4 , it is also interesting to examine the results of (1-2) and (1-2)′ where two variables for the degree of culture embedding are introduced in the regression. We find that in (1-2)′ the coefficients of TOP × CULTURE and TRAIN × CULTURE are significantly positive at the 1% and 10% level, respectively. This suggests that even among strong-culture firms, a firm is more likely to retain current employees once its culture is more deeply embedded into its organization. Firms appear to consider employees who embody the firm's culture as accumulated organizational capital.
We should also note that the effect of culture on the firm's employment policy is not only statistically significant but also of considerable magnitude. Table 5 provides regression results on the insider board ratio. The results (2-1) and (2-1 points, respectively. These results allow us to conclude that corporate culture significantly affects the firm's board structure. Table 6 summarizes the regression results on the debt-to-asset ratio (DEBT).
The results (3-1) and (3-1)′ indicate that CULTURE has a statistically significant negative effect on the firm's leverage. This supports Hypothesis 3: strong-culture firms tend to have less debt. In addition, the results of (3-2) and (3-2)′ show that the coefficients of TOP × CULTURE as well as those of CULTURE are significantly negative. These results suggest that corporate culture and its strength affect even the firm's capital structure decisions. While there have been extensive studies on capital structure, we provide the first evidence that the strength of corporate culture is a determinant of the firm's capital structure choice. Our result seems intuitive once we regard corporate culture as organizational capital which depreciates in the face of financial distress.
In fact, the magnitude of the culture effect is significant in the debt to asset ratio regressions. The result (3-2)′ indicates that if a firm has a strong culture with top management engagement in embedding, the debt to asset ratio decreases by 5.099 The negative relationship between culture embedding and interlocking shareholdings is inconsistent with Hypothesis 4. Why do we observe such a negative relationship? One possible explanation is that hostile takeovers are less likely to occur as corporate culture is more deeply embedded into the organization. Once cultural strength reaches a significant level, allowing the firm to enjoy a competitive advantage from its strong culture, outside investors will not take over the firm because they know that doing so would destroy the corporate culture and decrease the firm's value. If the decline in shareholder value arising from the decrease in the firm's value is greater than the rent extracted from the takeovers, outside investors are deprived of their incentive to implement a hostile takeover. In that case, the employees do not have to worry about the hold-up problem and the necessity of interlocking shareholdings decreases. This may be the reason we obtained negative signs for the culture embedding variables in (4-2) and (4-2)′.
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Corporate Culture and Performance
We have found that corporate culture is an important determinant of a firm's employment policy, board, and capital structures, and interlocking shareholdings.
Lastly, we examine whether corporate culture affects corporate performance. Since culture can be considered essential organizational capital, we predict that it raises productivity and contributes to superior performance, and put forth the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 5 (superior performance)
Strong-culture firms perform better than weak-culture firms.
Previous studies have not presented convincing evidence to validate this hypothesis.
While many studies have maintained that corporate culture improves corporate performance, there is also research that suggests that culture, especially nonadaptive versions, may undermine performance (Kotter and Heskett 1992) . In addition, as mentioned earlier, the quantitative evidence to prove that culture has a positive effect on performance is scant aside from the findings presented in a small number of exceptional works such as Denison (1984) , Gordon and DiTomaso (1992) , Kotter and 11 This explanation is consistent with interview evidence on the relationship between organizational capital and the possibility of hostile takeover. We interviewed an executive of a Japanese general trading company whose competitive edge comes from human assets. He said that hostile takeovers are unlikely to target general trading companies because even if a takeover were to occur, it would decrease shareholders' value because core employees would depart and organizational capital would depreciate. Rajan and Zingales (2000) report that in the U.K. this actually happened to a British advertising agency, Saatchi and Saatchi. In addition, we also interviewed an executive of a Japanese precision machinery company whose excellent performance appeared to come from its R&D capabilities. He said that "raiders may be able to take over our company, but would not be able to manage it." He seemed to imply that any outside investors who recognized their inability to manage his company would not attempt a takeover. These interview results suggest companies whose competitiveness stems mainly from organizational capital are less likely to become targets of hostile takeovers. Heskett (1992) , and Sorensen (2002) . To provide further evidence that culture and its strength affects performance, we use data from Japanese firms to run the performance regressions.
As a dependent variable, we adopt ROA (operating income to the book value of total assets; %). Independent variables include the culture variables (CULTURE, TOP× CULTURE, and TRAIN × CULTURE) and the size and age variables (lnTA, and AGE) defined in subsection 4-3. From Hypothesis 5, we predict the coefficient of CULTURE and the coefficients of TOP× CULTURE and TRAIN× CULTURE will be positive. We also estimate each regression equation including two control variables.
These two variables are PARENT, parent company's shareholdings ratio (%; the ratio of the shares held by the top shareholder whose holdings ratio exceeds 15%), and by Toyo Keizai Shinposha, respectively. Their means and standard deviations are shown in Table 3 .
As explained earlier, we estimated the regressions by OLS, using 15 years of panel data from 1986 to 2000 for 128 firms. Table 8 summarizes the regression results.
The results (5-1) and (5-1)′ show that CULTURE has significant positive coefficients.
These results support Hypothesis 5: strong-culture firms perform better than weak-culture firms. Therefore, our findings indicate that corporate culture does enhance the corporate performance of Japanese firms.
In addition, the results (5-2) and (5-2)′ show that culture embedding is crucial These results allow us to assert that corporate culture and its cultural strength are important determinants of corporate performance in Japan, with performance effects that are larger than or at least the same magnitude as those of corporate governance variables.
Concluding Remarks
In conclusion, we state once again that corporate culture does matter. Using data on Japanese firms from 1986 to 2000, when Japanese firms faced large business fluctuations stemming from the burgeoning and bursting of the bubble, and subsequent prolonged recession, we have shown that corporate culture and cultural strength significantly influence corporate policies affecting employment, board, and financial structures. At the same time, we have also confirmed that culture and the embedding of culture enhance corporate performance. These culture effects are found to be considerable in magnitude and greater than other factors. Corporate culture, often viewed as unobservable, ambiguous, and hard to measure by academics, is a crucial determinant of corporate policies and performance.
Japanese companies have long been thought to have derived competitive advantages from the corporate cultures that they have developed (Ouchi, 1981: Pascale and Athos,1981) . Scholars, however, have provided little quantitative evidence that would prove the importance of culture to Japanese firms. Through business upturns and downturns, strong-culture firms are more likely to adopt policies that encourage long-term employment, and to have more managers promoted from within than weak-culture firms. Strong-culture firms are also more likely to have lower debt levels, and a higher percentage of interlocking shareholdings than weak-culture firms. We provide evidence here that indicates that strong-culture Japanese firms consider culture to be a form of organizational capital which has significant effects on their strategies and policies.
The finance literature suggests that some of the above policy choices would result in lower performance and potential agency problems. For example, lower debt levels are often associated with the free cash flow problem and interlocking shareholdings are thought to induce insider control problems (Jensen,1986: Miyajima and Kuroki, 2007) . Surprisingly enough, firms with strong culture achieved relatively higher levels of performance throughout this period. This result indicates that corporate culture enhances corporate performance in the long run.
Our empirical results also help us to understand the organizational behavior of Japanese firms in recent years. During the long economic downturn from the 1990s to 2000s in Japan (sometimes called "the lost decade"), Japanese firms were criticized in the press and mass media for their resistance to change. 
